The European Union in disequilibrium: new intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism and integration theory in the post-Maastricht period by Hodson, Dermot & Puetter, U.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpp20
Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN: 1350-1763 (Print) 1466-4429 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20
The European Union in disequilibrium: new
intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism and
integration theory in the post-Maastricht period
Dermot Hodson & Uwe Puetter
To cite this article: Dermot Hodson & Uwe Puetter (2019): The European Union in disequilibrium:
new intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism and integration theory in the post-Maastricht period,
Journal of European Public Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1569712
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1569712
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 17 Jan 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 223
View Crossmark data
The European Union in disequilibrium: new
intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism and
integration theory in the post-Maastricht period
Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter
School of Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
ABSTRACT
The crises that weigh heavily on the European Union (EU) in the 2010s have
underlined the continued importance of integration theory, albeit in ways
that go beyond classic debates. Postfunctionalism, in particular, has shown
how European integration and its problems stand on shifting political
cleavages. And yet, postfunctionalist claims that such changes would create a
constraining dissensus in the EU rests uneasily with the intensiﬁcation of
European integration since the Maastricht Treaty was signed. This article oﬀers
a new intergovernmentalist explanation of this puzzle, which shows how
mainstream governing parties have circumvented rather than being
constrained by Eurosceptic challenger parties and challenger governments.
The result, it contends, is not a constraining but a destructive dissensus that
adds to the EU’s political disequilibrium. Understanding the persistence of this
disequilibrium and its potential to unwind disruptively is a key challenge for
contemporary integration theory.
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Introduction
For critics, European integration theory lends itself to ‘sterile debates and
dubious generalisations’ (Schmidt 1996) and a persistent lack of consensus
regarding ‘the causes and future of the integration process’ (Pollack 2015:
26). For its champions, integration theory has enriched not only the study
of the European Union (EU) but also wider debates in politics and inter-
national relations (Saurugger 2014: 5). That integration theory endures after
six decades favours the defenders in this debate, while placing the onus on
a new generation of integration scholars to sharpen their theoretical claims
and counter accusations of intellectual path dependence and diminishing
returns.
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The period since the 1992Maastricht Treaty is a challenging one for theorists.
While the re-launch of European integration in the 1980s prompted a wave of
theorising about states and supranational institutions (Moravcsik 1998; Stone
Sweet and Sandholtz 1998; Stone Sweet et al. 2001), the absence of a grand
projet after Maastricht discouraged scholars from thinking about the troubling
dynamics of integration during this period. Neofunctionalism and liberal inter-
governmentalism tended to view integration as losing momentum and neither
was overly alarmed by the problems of legitimacy facing the EU (Mattli and
Stone Sweet 2012; Moravcsik 2012). In the 2010s, the euro crisis, the migration
crisis, Brexit and the illiberal challenge have, as Hooghe and Marks show in this
volume (2019), encouraged scholars to re-engage with the grand theories of
integration: intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.
Postfunctionalism was ahead of the theoretical curve in thinking about the
post-Maastricht period as one in which political contestation over integration
has moved to the centre of EU politics. Hooghe and Marks (2009) drew a link
between the EU’s legitimacy problems, changes in public opinion and the rise
of Eurosceptic parties. Central to their approach is the claim that the ‘permiss-
ive consensus’ over Europe has given way to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (ibid.:
5). ‘Party leaders in positions of authority’, they state, ‘must look over their
shoulders when negotiating European issues’ and ‘[w]hat they see does not
reassure them’ (ibid.). New intergovernmentalism is another, more recent
attempt to understand post-Maastricht integration (Bickerton et al. 2015a,
2015b; Puetter 2012, 2014). Like earlier versions of intergovernmentalism, it
sees governments rather than supranational institutions as the prime
movers behind integration. It breaks from tradition, however, by seeing the
post-Maastricht period as one in which integration has intensiﬁed rather
than slowed. It also highlights the tensions – rather than the essential conti-
nuity – between elite interests and the interests of domestic constituents.
New intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism share common ground
in their concern for the EU’s legitimacy problems as a constituent feature of
post-Maastricht politics (Bickerton et al. 2015b: 33–36). And, yet, they also
give rise to competing claims. While postfunctionalism expects national gov-
ernments to ‘try to anticipate the eﬀect of their decisions [regarding European
integration] on domestic publics’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 9) it remains
agnostic about what the speciﬁc consequences are for integration. New inter-
governmentalism sees member states as pressing ahead with integration but
in ways that redirect rather than redress the problems of legitimacy facing the
EU. In this sense, new intergovernmentalism understands the post-Maastricht
period not primarily as one of a constraining dissensus in which integration is
impeded. Rather, it sees divides between integrationist leaders and a sceptical
public as fuelling a destructive dissensus that casts doubt on the future sus-
tainability of the EU.
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While not proclaiming disintegration as inevitable, new intergovernment-
alism invites scholars to rethink traditional assumptions about European inte-
gration as being in – or tending towards – equilibrium in order to grasp more
fully the pernicious political dynamics facing the EU. It sees the EU as being in
disequilibrium, a term which captures growing societal tension in a political
system driven by pro-integration consensus but shielded from growing
public disenchantment with policy outcomes (Bickerton et al. 2015b: 36–7).
New intergovernmentalism has generated broad debate about who steers
the EU in times of turmoil (Schmidt 2018) and about the Union’s evolving
institutional choices (Moravcsik 2018: 1656). At the same time, it has faced
questions about what, if anything, it oﬀers over existing integration theory
(Kleine and Pollack 2018). The concept of disequilibrium has been criticised
as a normatively-loaded hypothesis that is diﬃcult to test (Bulmer 2015).
This article moves beyond existing contributions on new intergovernment-
alism by further developing the concept of disequilibrium. We demonstrate
the concept’s analytical relevance in research on contemporary EU politics
and highlight what it adds to our understanding of European integration.
To this end, we focus on a particular feature of post-Maastricht politics: how
pro-EU mainstream parties and Eurosceptic challengers coexist at a time of
intensifying integration for the Union. The ﬁrst section explores how new
intergovernmentalism departs from the idea of equilibrium underpinning
existing grand theories, and speciﬁes the conditions under which this disequi-
librium might unravel. The second section employs the concept of disequili-
brium to interrogate the rise of challenger parties and, what we call,
challenger governments since Maastricht. The concluding section draws
lessons for the theory and practice of European integration.
Europe’s disequilibrium
Equilibrium is a concept to which political scientists have periodically turned
to understand social phenomena. They use the term loosely, drawing on dis-
parate debates within economics, game theory and evolutionary biology.
Equilibrium is a foundational concept for economic theory, which variously
describes a balance of forces, a situation in which there is no endogenous
driver of change or an outcome that the economy tends towards (Milgate
1994: 179). A static equilibrium denotes the absence of change while a
dynamic equilibrium implies a steady rate of growth. Following Arrow
(1959), economists have concentrated less on equilibria than on the behav-
iour of the economy under disequilibrium conditions, with New Keynesian
economists at the forefront of debates about why disequilibria persist over
long periods (Blanchard 2000) and how to overcome the coordination pro-
blems posed by multiple equilibria (Cooper and John 1988). Basic game
theory understands an equilibrium as a so-called solution concept, in which
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players have no incentive to revise their choices, as in the Nash Equilibrium.
More sophisticated concepts, as in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, incorporate
incomplete information or faulty behaviour, as in the trembling hand perfect
equilibrium. In evolutionary biology, Eldredge and Gould (1972) pioneered the
concept of punctuated equilibrium to describe how new species arise very
rapidly in speciﬁc populations in contrast to the incrementalism implied by
phyletic gradualism.
David Easton encouraged political scientists to think about what they could
learn from economics about equilibrium (Easton 1956: 96–97). ‘The processes
and structures of political systems are not freely buﬀeted about by the vag-
aries of chance’, he wrote, ‘through their own responding actions [they] are
capable of persisting even in a world of rapid change’ (Easton 1965: 77–78).
Easton’s ﬂow model conceptualised the role of equilibrating forces in politics.
For a political system to persist rather than fail, Easton argued, authorities
must generate outputs that both respond to demands and support for the
system, and, through their impact on the environment, enrich rather than
undermine demands and support for future outputs (ibid.: 103–135).
This ﬂowmodel informed Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) contribution to
neofunctionalism. They sought to understand the conditions under which the
European Community would tend towards equilibrium or spillback, the
former describing a situation in which decision-making is institutionalised
but without signiﬁcant pressure for further institutionalisation and the latter
referring to a situation in which this equilibrium is disturbed and institutiona-
lisation decreases. Their study oﬀered one of the early conceptualisations of
the permissive consensus as a key source of systemic support and hence an
equilibrating force (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 121). Political disturbances
may delay, postpone or deter integration, yet, they do not stop the neofunc-
tionalist heart of the process from beating. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998,
2012), Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein (2001) and Niemann and Ioannou
(2015), in more recent neofunctionalist scholarship, do not explicitly use the
concept of equilibrium. Yet, like their intellectual predecessors, they share a
remarkable conﬁdence with regard to the further trajectory of integration.
Functional spill-over and supranational entrepreneurship trigger political
action, and they may trigger counter-mobilisation but, as Philippe Schmitter
(2009: 211) recalls, neofunctionalism assumes that ‘mass publics would be
aroused to protect the acquis communautaire against the resistance of
entrenched national political elites’. Mattli and Stone Sweet (2012) and
Jones et al. (2016) make passing reference to the concept of equilibrium
but see European integration as being subject to a punctuated equilibrium.
This builds on Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), who highlight the link
between the idea of punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures in historical
institutionalist research.
4 D. HODSON AND U. PUETTER
Whereas neofunctionalism sees the EU as tending towards equilibrium,
liberal intergovernmentalism suggests that it has already arrived. The EU,
Andrew Moravcsik argues, has reached ‘a stable constitutional equilibrium’
and its ‘current constitutional arrangements are substantively eﬀective, insti-
tutionally protected, and democratically legitimate’ (Moravcsik 2005: 349).
This conception of equilibrium has both a game theoretic and a normative
dimension. The ﬁrst sees governments as having little incentive to revise
current institutional choices. The second sees the European constitutional
settlement as ‘normatively attractive’ (Moravcsik 2005: 351) in spite of con-
cerns over the EU’s legitimacy, which the author sees as being misplaced.
Although he is quick to dismiss neofunctionalism as ‘not a theory of equili-
brium, but of change’ (ibid.: 353), Moravcsik channels Lindberg and Schein-
gold (1970) and Easton (1965) when he concludes that the EU is ‘a
constitutional system that no longer needs to expand and deepen in order
to assure its own continued existence’ (Moravcsik 2005: 376). In this sense,
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism embody a teleological
view of European integration as moving forward towards its ﬁnal form
(Parsons and Matthijs 2015: 231).
Equilibrium is not a concept with which postfunctionalism explicitly
engages. The idea of constraining dissensus suggests that pro-EU elites face
continuous political contestations over further integration, the outcome of
which is uncertain. Yet, it is certain to inﬂuence ‘regime outcomes’ (Hooghe
and Marks 2009: 23) in some way. ‘Hence the range of possible outcomes
under postfunctionalism encompasses not only the status quo or its punctu-
ated reform, but also the possibility of disintegration’, Hooghe and Marks con-
clude in this volume (2019). In this sense, postfunctionalism suggests a
multiple equilibrium conception of European integration in which the
future direction of the Union is diﬃcult to predict on the basis of underlying
economic and political conditions.
New intergovernmentalism, in contrast, sees the post-Maastricht EU as
being in a persistent state of disequilibrium. This article advances the discus-
sion of disequilibrium by conceptualising it as the EU’s tendency to produce
policy outputs that polarise politics in ways that cast doubt on the future of
the Union. This tendency brings systemic risks, including the erosion of the
EU’s current normative order, in political and legal terms, and threats to
the Union’s territorial integrity and that of major policy domains, such as the
single currency. This disequilibrium is the product, we conjecture, of dysfunc-
tional outputs by integrationist and consensus-seeking elites (Puetter 2012;
cf. Schmidt 2018), on the one hand, and dysfunctional inputs, including
public scepticism about the beneﬁts of European integration and declining
trust in the EU and national political systems (Mair 2013), on the other hand.
Major institutional reform eﬀorts of the post-Maastricht period are indica-
tive of the EU’s disequilibrium. The Constitutional Treaty was not, as Moravcsik
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(2008) implies, a misguided deviation from the EU’s constitutional settlement.
It was one of several attempts to acknowledge and address the EU’s systemic
problems during the post-Maastricht period. The European Commission’s
White Paper on European Governance, Plan D for Democracy and, in their
own ways, the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties are others (Hodson
and Maher 2018: 227–233). National governments were acutely aware of
the problems of trust and legitimacy facing the EU, in other words, but
their institutional ﬁxes failed.
Faced with functional pressures for cooperation and public scepticism
about deeper integration, member state governments in the post-Maastricht
period tend not to limit integration but to redirect it. Nowhere was this clearer
than in the euro crisis. By taking eurozone politics in their own hands, as evi-
denced by the leadership roles of the Eurogroup and Euro Summits, and
avoiding the delegation of new powers to the European Commission along
traditional lines where possible, governments signalled that they, rather
than supranational bureaucracies, were in charge of Europe. The creation of
de novo bodies over which governments exercise a high degree of control
– such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European Resolution
Board – were founded in the same spirit. But these policy outputs ampliﬁed
rather then addressed the EU’s disequilibrium. While both centre-left and
centre-right mainstream pro-EU parties stuck with eurozone consensus poli-
tics, voters who were looking for alternative choices in eurozone politics gravi-
tated towards parties at the ends of the political spectrum. Not all of these
parties were Eurosceptic but those that were upped the stakes and their
own electoral fortunes by casting doubt not only on the future of the euro
but of the EU itself, as in Marine Le Pen’s strong display in France’s 2017 pre-
sidential election. Member states may have saved the euro but in so doing
they turned the single currency into a political lightening rod for the EU’s prin-
cipled opponents.
Disequilibrium is a concept that suggests continuity and rupture. While the
disequilibrium persists, the EU’s systemic problems mount but the political
system survives. When the disequilibrium unwinds, the political system
faces a large and potentially disorderly adjustment. The most plausible scen-
ario is that an unwinding of disequilibrium would give way to disintegration in
speciﬁc policy domains or among speciﬁc member states (Vollaard 2014). The
eurozone’s near-miss with Grexit in 2015 gives an indication of how disorderly
such an eventuality could be. During the EU’s most recent crises a darker scen-
ario has become imaginable in which a Eurosceptic challenger party not only
ﬂirts with the idea of EU exit but actively campaigns for it, triggering a chain
reaction in other member states. Were the EU’s large, founding states to be
caught up in this crisis, we contend, the Union could well collapse (Hodson
and Puetter 2018).
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The politics of challenging while integrating
For new intergovernmentalism, a central puzzle is how integration has contin-
ued post-Maastricht while a set of new political actors has sought to capitalise
on public discontent in the EU. This section takes a closer look at the rise of
challenger parties and, more recently, challenger governments, which
contest the normative foundations of the post-Maastricht EU: democracy,
pluralism and the rule of law. It seeks to understand how EU elites have
responded to – and accommodated – challengers without interrupting inte-
gration. The EU’s political disequilibrium has endured because of political
choices made by elites and challengers that enabled further integration but
in ways that have magniﬁed the Union’s disequilibrium.
Challenger parties
In December 1973, Denmark’s Progress Party secured second place in parlia-
mentary elections. This was the ﬁrst time that a hard Eurosceptic party – that is
a party with principled opposition to the EU and integration (Szczerbiak and
Taggart 2008) – made such a mark. In the following two decades, Eurosceptic
challenger parties caused occasional upsets, as in the 35 seats secured by the
Front national in the 1986 National Assembly election. However, it was not
until the Maastricht Treaty that challenger parties became a pervasive
feature of EU politics. Hooghe and Marks (2009) were among the ﬁrst to see
this. The process through which the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated and
eventually ratiﬁed, they argued, laid bare the elite-bargain underpinning Euro-
pean integration and its disconnect with public opinion as never before. It
provided an early indication of a new transnational cleavage between
voters with diametrically opposed but equally intensive preferences on inte-
gration. Hooghe and Marks (2009) refer to the poles of this new cleavage as
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) parties and green/alternative/liber-
tarian (GAL). parties. The former reject integration because of concerns over
sovereignty, self-rule and foreign inﬂuence and the latter are more likely to
see Europe as the embodiment of cosmopolitan values, far-left critics of the
EU as a capitalist club notwithstanding.
EU governments have undoubtedly been ‘looking over their shoulders’
(Hooghe and Marks 2009: 5) at these parties but what they saw did not
deter their commitment to closer cooperation across a host of policy areas.
What we see instead chimes with the new intergovernmentalism’s idea of dis-
equilibrium. Eurosceptic challenger parties capitalised on changing political
cleavages and the deepening of public distrust towards the EU but without,
for the most part, gaining a signiﬁcant grip on political power. Mainstream
political leaders were acutely aware of this Eurosceptic challenge but also
insulated from it. As a result, the post-Maastricht consensus withstood political
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pressure in the short-term but in ways that magniﬁed the gap between elite
and popular preferences.
Radical TAN parties with principled opposition to European integration
such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Front national may have
stolen a march on Europe’s politicians but GAL parties followed. They chal-
lenge established pro-EU parties but they diﬀerentiate between their tren-
chant criticisms of speciﬁc EU policies and an essential commitment to
European integration. In this sense, such parties are challengers without
being Eurosceptic in any traditional sense. Podemos in Spain is an example
of such a party on the new left, a position captured in its slogan ‘the EU is
the problem (more) Europe is the only solution’ (della Porta et al. 2017:
218). Similar views were expressed by Syriza. In power, Alexis Tspiras, for all
his criticisms of how the EU handled the euro crisis, emerged as a staunch
defender of euro membership. Emmanuel Macron’s La République En
Marche! provides an example of how GAL parties can counter TAN parties’
warnings over sovereignty, self-rule and foreign inﬂuence with a cosmopoli-
tan message (Gougou and Persico 2017). Five out of the eleven presidential
candidates in the ﬁrst round of this contest ﬂirted with Frexit (Costa 2017)
but Macron won after an avowedly pro-EU campaign.
TAN parties have also generally struggled to win power in Europe. Paul
Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2013) cite 22 cases in which Eurosceptic
parties ‘came in from the cold’ although this survey includes hard and soft
Eurosceptics and cases in which these parties supported minority govern-
ments as well as entered coalitions. As of 2017, extreme TAN parties’ vote
share in national parliamentary elections averaged 11%, a worrying develop-
ment for the EU to be sure, but one that typically left these parties in opposi-
tion. The notable exceptions are the challenger governments in Hungary, Italy
and Poland (see next section). Cas Mudde (2013) oﬀers a number of reasons
for the radical right’s ‘governmental impotence’, including their narrow focus
on speciﬁc issues at the expense of socio-economic concerns, a lack of
support from bureaucracies and non-governmental actors, their typically
junior status in coalitions if they do win power and the fact that they draw
their appeal from being in opposition.
TAN parties’ most signiﬁcant inﬂuence has been indirect rather than direct
and yet even here their impact on EU policies has beenmuted. A large n analy-
sis of expert surveys by Maurits Meijers (2017) shows that Eurosceptic challen-
gers that attach high salience to European issues encourage mainstream
parties to change their tone on Europe. There are numerous examples to
support this trend, including the Republican candidate François Fillon’s declin-
ing enthusiasm for the EU as the French presidential election progressed. But
posturing is not policy. Although Fillon spoke in general terms about limiting
the Commission’s powers he eschewed talk of exiting the euro and calls for an
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EU referendum (Lees 2017). A similar story can be told about Italian Prime Min-
ister Matteo Renzi’s ‘euro-bashing’ strategy (Herszenhorn and Barigazzi 2016).
Mainstream parties have generally stayed the course on Europe even as
their vote share declined. Although Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a chal-
lenger party founded, in part, over opposition to ﬁnancial support for euro-
zone members, gained 94 seats in Germany’s 2017 federal elections, the
immediate impact on Germany’s EU policy was limited. True, Angela
Merkel’s room to agree radical reforms to eurozone governance may be
seen as having been indirectly constrained by the AfD but the chancellor
was no radical to begin with. Instead, she stuck with the post-Maastricht con-
sensus at the Franco-German summit in June 2018 by agreeing to incremental
steps to strengthen European Banking Union and the European Stability
Mechanism while diluting discussions over a eurozone budget. The AfD,
meanwhile, overtook the SPD in an opinion poll published in July 2018
(Buck 2018).
A similar dynamic can be seen in the Netherlands, where Prime Minister
Mark Rutte struck a noticeably more defensive tone on Europe after Geert
Wilders’s Freedom Party’s strong showing in the 2017 election. The ‘danger
is real’, Rutte told an audience in Berlin in March 2018, ‘because all over
Europe, we are seeing the rise of parties on the ﬂanks of the political spectrum
that simply deny the importance of European cooperation’ (Rutte 2018). In
spite of such defensiveness, the Dutch prime minister showed limited incli-
nation for challenging the post-Maastricht consensus, making the case
instead for European Banking Union and the creation of a European Monetary
Fund. Geert Wilders’ inﬂuence on domestic policies was altogether greater, as
evidenced by the Staten-Generaal’s decision in June 2018 to adopt a partial
‘burqa ban’.
The UK’s referendum vote to leave the EU is the most signiﬁcant example
of Eurosceptic contagion to date, although we understand it not as a rejection
of the post-Maastricht consensus by a mainstream party but an attempt to
preserve the status quo that misﬁred spectacularly. David Cameron was not,
by British standards, and the standards of his Conservative Party in particular,
especially Eurosceptic. ‘While parents worried about childcare, getting the
kids to school, balancing work and family life – we were banging on about
Europe’, he said in his ﬁrst speech as party leader (Cameron 2006). That
Cameron went from downplaying the EU to calling a referendum was due
not only to intra-party dissent but primarily the perceived electoral threat
from UKIP. By January 2013, UKIP were polling at a record 15% nationally.
With European Parliament elections on the horizon and a general election
two years away, the Conservative leader pledged a referendum. Cameron’s
resignation announcement, hours after the referendum result, merely under-
lined how Brexit was a scenario that the Prime Minister had sought to avoid.
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Challenger governments
The previous section discussed the rise of Eurosceptic challenger parties,
which have been invigorated by the post-Maastricht period but typically
not empowered by it, thus preventing this disequilibrium from unwinding
to date. We propose the concept of challenger governments for analysing
what happens when parties led by politicians who are sharply critical of the
current trajectory of integration form governments in their own right or act
as senior coalition partners. We count Hungary’s Fidesz-led governments
since 2010 under prime minister Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Prawo i Sprawie-
dliwość (PiS) party, which is led by Jarosław Kaczyński and has governed
Poland since November 2015 under the prime ministers Beata Szydło
(2015–2017) and Mateusz Morawiecki (2017-). These parties have been
openly hostile to the EU in ways never seen before among Europe’s governing
parties. Both cases are analysed in this section, which also oﬀers initial reﬂec-
tions on Italy’s League and Five Star Movement coalition, which assumed
oﬃce in June 2018. The Eurosceptic challenge presented by these govern-
ments sets them apart from governing parties that face backbench opposition
over Europe, as in the UK Conservative Party, or those that challenge speciﬁc
EU policies while maintaining strong support for EU integration, as in the case
of Greece’s Syriza government. Nor do we include governments that count
Eurosceptic challengers as junior coalition members, which have not (yet)
managed to impose a radically diﬀerent stance towards the EU on govern-
ment policy. This includes Austria’s ÖVP/FPÖ coalition, although it is important
to recognise that FPÖ is, a coalition partner of considerable size and inﬂuence.
Challenger governments pursue their principled opposition to the EU not
by engaging in a frontal assault on the Union. Though they rarely miss an
opportunity to criticise the EU, they develop an ambivalent Euroscepticism
when in power. In a much-quoted speech in 2014, Hungarian prime minister
Orbán sketched a vision of Europe that was at odds with the EU’s treaty-
deﬁned values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law (Article 2, Treaty
on European Union). And yet, the prime minister was at pains to defend his
vision as one that was compatible with continued membership. ‘When I
mention the European Union, I am not doing this because I think it is imposs-
ible to build an illiberal nation state within the EU’, he told his audience, ‘I
think this is possible’ (Orbán 2014). True to his word, Orbán systematically
weakened the rule of law after the 2010 election by curbing the powers of
the constitutional court, while undermining political freedoms enjoyed by
the media and non-governmental organisations.
Polish PiS party leader Kaczyński is equally ambivalent. Although he has
been sharply critical of the EU for interfering in the aﬀairs of a ‘big country’
(Tarquini 2016), he has portrayed himself as a politician who wishes to save
Europe from itself. Poland must ‘show the sick Europe of today the path
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back to health, fundamental values, true freedom and a stronger civilisation
based on Christianity’, he said in a speech in 2016 to mark the centenary of
the country’s independence (Henley 2018). The PiS government’s controver-
sial reform of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal prompted the European Com-
mission to launch a rule of law dialogue with Polish authorities in January
2016. After this dialogue failed to bear fruit, the Commission in December
2017 took the unprecedented step of initiating disciplinary measures
against Poland under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union.
Challenger governments consistently depict themselves as defenders of
national authority from the EU. In Hungary the Orbán government invited citi-
zens to express their frustration with the EU’s interference in migration, tax
and economic policies under its ‘Stop Brussels’ campaign (Cerulus 2017; Euro-
pean Commission 2017). It went further still with its 2016 referendum, which
asked voters whether they wanted the EU to be able to mandate the obliga-
tory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the
approval of parliament. Low turnout rendered the result invalid but the gov-
ernment nonetheless claimed victory against the EU and its migration policy.
After it came to power in 2015, Poland’s PiS party ran a public campaign
against what it perceives as a German dominated EU. The EU’s call on the gov-
ernment in Warsaw to resettle more refugees was denounced as an order
from Germany (Hassel 2017). In a similar vein the PiS party publication
Gazeta Polska claimed of anti-government protests: ‘A German minister
ﬁnanced the putsch.’ (ibid.).
One way in which challenger parties have channelled their opposition to
the EU has been to oppose appointments of EU top jobs – a clear breach
with etiquette in Brussels. In 2014, Orbán refused to vote for Jean-Claude
Juncker as Commission president. In March 2017 Polish prime minister
Szydło staunchly opposed the re-election of Donald Tusk as European
Council president. Yet, on other occasions, challenger governments were
eager to display their conformity with consensus politics. In January 2012,
Orbán went with the mainstream position in the European Council and
signed up to the Fiscal Compact. It was a document agreed outside EU law
and opposed by the United Kingdom and (for a while) the Czech Republic.
Moreover, the consensus in the European Council and the Foreign Aﬀairs
Council regarding the EU’s sanctions policy against Russia could be main-
tained despite Orbán’s attempts to court the Russian president Vladimir
Putin. At the European Council, which expelled Russian diplomats in response
to the Salisbury attack, the Hungarian government claimed afterwards, that it
was Orbán who proposed that the head of the EU delegation in Russia should
be recalled (Hungarian Government 2018).
In spite of such opposition, challenger governments do not propagate exit
from the EU. In September 2017, Hungarian foreign minister Peter Szijjarto
made clear his view that ‘Hungary’s place is in the EU – no one should
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question this’ (Byrne and Buckley 2017). In a similar vein, Orbán distanced
himself from the Leave campaign in the UK when he told British media
after the Brexit vote that ‘[w]e are sad’ and that his government used to see
the UK as a ‘strategic partner’ within the pre-Brexit EU (Foster 2016). The Hun-
garian prime minister’s aim, it would seem, is to advance political positions
that are incompatible with the EU’s current political order rather than
seeking to exit the EU. Kaczyński, likewise, described Brexit as a blow to the
EU’s eﬀorts to become a ‘global superpower’ and even warned that Euroscep-
tic parties such as Front national, the Lega, the 5-Star-Movement and the AfD
could succeed in unravelling the EU (Tarquini 2016). For Kaczyński, the priority
is to strengthen the nation state within the EU in order to preserve the Union
as a whole: ‘Either we reform the EU or it collapses’ (ibid.).
Ambivalence in this case is not a one-sided aﬀair. EU leaders have
addressed strongly worded statements to challenger governments, yet they
are also at pains to refer to them as political partners. This is most clearly
underlined by the continued membership of Fidesz in the European
Peoples Party (EPP). For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
though she has been critical of Hungary’s opposition to EU migration policy
(Byrne and Buckley 2017), has remained mostly silent on Hungary’s domestic
transformations and the issue of EPP Group membership. Manfred Weber, the
chair of the EPP Group in the European Parliament and a political ally of
Merkel in Germany, has routinely resisted calls from within and outside the
EPP to expel Fidesz and emerged as a central ﬁgure in directing the EPP’s
course regarding Hungary. He has even praised Orbán for having been in
compliance with EU reprimands (Esslinger and Ulrich 2018). Although
Weber supported the European Parliament’s belated decision to trigger an
Article 7 procedure against Hungary, the German MEP resisted calls by his
challenger Alexander Stubb in the EPP’s race to appoint a ‘lead candidate’
for the 2019 European elections to expel Fidesz. It came as little surprise
when Orbán backed Weber’s ultimately successful candidacy.
The European Commission has taken a more combative line towards chal-
lenger governments but not overly so. In her analysis of infringement pro-
ceedings, which involved rule of law issues including Hungary’s
amendments of its constitution which weakened the independence of the
constitutional court, Agnes Batory (2016) traces a pattern of conﬂict which
she refers to as ‘creative and symbolic compliance’. Instead of ignoring the
Commission’s requests altogether the Hungarian government agreed to
smaller changes to intended or already adopted measures and legislative
changes, which did not aﬀect the substance of the constitutional amend-
ments including the rearrangement of the composition of the constitutional
court. As Batory argues, member states that refuse substantial compliance
can get away with these tactics as long as the preservation of the image of
the EU’s legal order as a functioning one is upheld. Upholding the image of
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the consensus culture is rated to be more important than pursuing an
eﬀective strategy against actual rule of law backsliding (Pech and Scheppele
2017).
The EU has thus treaded softly with challenger governments, chastising
them on occasion but avoiding confrontation where possible even when fun-
damental values are at stake. Challenger governments, in turn, have agreed to
small-scale amendments of controversial legislation, and gone along with the
general direction of EU policy-making, however much they may disagree with
speciﬁc policies. The Polish government’s decision in November 2018 to
reinstate judges that had been forced to retire following a ruling from the
Court of Justice of the EU is a striking exception and, yet, it is too soon to
say whether it was a tactical retreat or a turning point (Steinbeis 2018). The
overall trend of avoiding confrontation illustrates both the resilience as well
as the narrowness of the post-Maastricht consensus, with concerns over the
rule of law and fundamental rights seen as secondary to the aim of protecting
and advancing policy cooperation across a host of other policy areas.
The rise of challenger governments has increased the readiness of main-
stream parties to tolerate violations of the EU’s normative consensus as
long as they do not jeopardise the day-to-day functioning of key areas of
EU politics. Kelemen (2017: 217–221) describes this as an ‘authoritarian equi-
librium’ in which EU partisan politics is strong enough to protect illiberal
leaders such as Orbán but too weak to bolster liberal opposition parties.
Instead, we think of the EU’s toleration of challenger governments as deepen-
ing the EU’s disequilibrium by emboldening challenger governments and
tarnishing those who tolerate them. Far from moderating his views after
winning re-election in 2018, Viktor Orbán took aim at new targets, as evi-
denced by his decision to end accreditation and ﬁnancing for postgraduate
programmes in gender studies. Senior EPP politicians may have avoided
public scrutiny over their aﬃliation with Fidesz but the party itself was
suﬃciently rattled to adopt an emergency resolution at its Congress in
November 2018 in which it acknowledged threats to EU values and the rule
of law and urged member state governments to refrain from ‘conspiracy the-
ories… and all out attacks’ against EU institutions (EPP 2018).
That this uneasy bargain between pro-EU and challenger governments
will hold is not preordained. Predictions that Eurosceptic parties would
form governments and block reforms (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 18) have
so far not come to pass but they could yet do so. Italy’s League and Five
Star Movement coalition government could be a game changer in this
regard. Meeting in August 2018, Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini, Deputy
Prime Minister and leader of the League, openly challenged the ‘pro-
migration’ policies of Emmanuel Macron and promised to unite at the Euro-
pean Parliament elections in 2019. And yet, the new Italian government too
has tempered its rhetoric on Europe. Talk of returning to a ‘pre-Maastricht
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EU’ was cut from the ﬁnal coalition agreement (Politi 2018) to be replaced
by reassurances of Italy’s commitment to the EU and euro membership.
Similarly, the government’s threat to quit the EU’s military mission Sophia
in the Mediterranean after closing Italian ports to migrant ships was fol-
lowed by pragmatic behind the scenes talks about reforming the EU’s
refugee policy (Deutsche Welle 2018).
Conclusions
The multiple crises confronting the EU in the 2010s have reinvigorated the
study of European integration, while challenging traditional grand theories.
Postfunctionalism is an ambitious attempt to shift the terms of debate. The
traditional politics of right-left competition, it shows, has given way to a
more nebulous competition between parties that deﬁne themselves for or
against the sort of transnationalism that the EU embodies. Path breaking
though postfunctionalism is, its claim that such changes would create a con-
straining dissensus in the EU rests uneasily with the intensiﬁcation of Euro-
pean integration since the Maastricht Treaty was signed. This article has
approached this puzzle from a new intergovernmental perspective by
seeking to understand how pro-EU elites have accommodated and circum-
vented Eurosceptic party politics. The evidence presented points not
towards a constraining consensus but a destructive one that has added to
the EU’s disequilibrium. The article further advanced the new intergovernm-
alist notion of disequilibrium and demonstrated its use-value in empirical
research, thus also responding to criticism that it may be diﬃcult to test
(Bulmer 2015). This new intergovernmentalist account engaged grand the-
ories of integration by oﬀering a deﬁnition of disequilibrium which does
not rely on notions of crisis or disruptions of an otherwise steady course. By
conceptualising the emergence of countervailing dynamics in post-Maastricht
EU politics new intergovernmentalism also moves beyond notions of ‘spill-
back’ in more recent neofunctionalist scholarship which acknowledges that
‘decision cycles [have] generated further imbalances and contradictions
thus avoiding encapsulation’ (Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55), yet does
not conceptualise these imbalances and contradictions in their own right.
Eurosceptic challenger parties, this article has shown, have been greatly invi-
gorated by the shift in public attitudes towards the EU in the post-Maastricht
period but not empowered for the most part. These parties have remained in
opposition for much of the post-Maastricht period. Although such parties
may exert indirect inﬂuence in some domains, their impact on the EU policies
ofmainstream partiesmore generally has, except for the case of the British Con-
servative Party, been limited. Challenger governments, a more recent phenom-
enon, have focused their ire on speciﬁc EU policies and, more generally, on the
Union’s foundational values. But thesegovernments remainpublicly committed
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to continued EUmembership. Mainstream pro-EU parties have been pragmatic
in their engagement with challenger governments and the former have been
little troubled by the latter providing the post-Maastricht consensus holds.
What this adds up to is a picture of a political system in which EU elites are
adept at producing short-term solutions to crises but in ways that add to
Europe’s disequilibrium. The EU is at risk not only from Eurosceptic challengers
but from member state governments’ determination to circumvent them. To
assume that the EU will survive in spite of its disequilibrium oﬀers too static a
view of political systems. The Union is built to last, argues Daniel Kelemen
(2007), because of its structural, judicial, partisan and socio-cultural safeguards.
Compelling though this analysis is, we ﬁnd it (increasingly) less diﬃcult to
imagine that by accommodating challenger parties and governments without
addressing the concerns of those who vote for them, by deepening integration
in ways that run contrary to its own foundational values, by amplifying rather
than managing its disequilibrium, the EU leaves its own future in doubt.
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